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Abstract
We describe a practical implementation of the modular eballot system proposed in
ref. [1].
1 Introduction
Implementing a balloting system requires making many choices when the theoretical
steps of the protocol must be realized by software procedures. Simple statements
can become quite complex to implement and many subtle points arise which could
reduce or make useless the entire protocol.
For this reason, we consider to be a very important issue to implement in a
working system the protocol proposed in ref. [1]. We will see as some a-priori
simple steps are quite problematic to implement and we discuss our solutions and
possible improvements.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the approach taken
in building the system, in section 3 the hardware and software choices, in section
4 the procedure to setup the ballot, in section 5 the setup of the operating system
and in section 6 the setup of the application.
2 Approach
To implement the modular eballot protocol we can choose basically one of the
following approaches:
1. design, develop and implement custom hardware and software
2. design, develop and implement custom software based on commercially avail-
able hardware
3. use common hardware and software and design, develop and implement only
the specific software applications needed to implement the protocol.
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If we consider these three approaches purely theoretically, they are obviously
ordered in decreasing level of security. Indeed a custom hardware/software solution
can in principle offer the maximum possible security.
But in practice the effort required by approaches 1 and 2 is often too large.
Besides the need for a large team of developers and long developing times, the
probability that at least for the first few releases/models there will be many vulner-
abilities, is very high.
In our setup with limited resources and short developing times, we have adopted
the third approach, choosing common hardware and well proved software to im-
plement the eballot protocol. We have selected well known and well supported
software, which have known history of vulnerabilities and fast releases of patches.
We have then chosen software that we can trust in the sense that they have a
very large number of users and large support, trading the low number of vulnera-
bilities and external support for the absence of features which could be helpful in
implementing the protocol and the presence of features not needed for it.
3 The hardware/software choices
For the first release of the implementation we have chosen the simplest possibility:
• the voter uses her own web browser
• the AuthSrv and the VoteSrv are implemented as web applications running on
common web servers
• the Anonymizer is a simple NAT device.
With this setup it is not possible to implement the blind signature version of the
protocol presented in ref. [2] and discussed in Appendix A of ref. [1]. We will not
consider blind signatures for our implementation nor in the rest of this paper.
An improvement on the current implementation would be to realize the client
proxy. This will allow to add more features for the voter, like a more controlled
access to the system, automatic check of the digital certificate of the web sites,
removal at the origin of all personal information from the http transaction, like the
UserAgent field. Notice that the realization of a client proxy will require:
• to support versions of the client proxy for all computing platforms that the
voters could use
• the possibility of vulnerabilities in the client proxy and the necessity to imple-
ment a system to manage its patches, distribution of new releases etc.
For what concerns the Anonymizer, a simple approach to improve over the simple
NAT device is to make the voters access the web servers through the tor network
[3].
In any case, the voter (or the client proxy for her) must check the fingerprints
of the digital certificates of the AuthSrv and VoteSrv to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks.
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For what concerns the Operating System, the choice has been dictated mostly
by our experience and personal competence and has been a Linux distribution. The
system can be implemented almost identically on any *BSD distribution or Unix-like
OS. What in particular lead us to the choice of Linux has been the RSBAC kernel
patch [4] which provides Mandatory Access Control (MAC) features very useful for
the security of the servers and for implementing some aspects of the protocol.
As for the web server application, it has obviously been chosen Apache [5] with
PHP [6]. For added simplicity, no SQL server is used but all data is stored in flat
files. For SSL/TLS openssl [7] is used whereas for the cryptographic operations of
the protocol the gnupg [8] implementation of OpenPGP [9] with the gpgme and
gpg-agent extensions, has been adopted.
Clocks of the servers are synchronized using ntp [10] but the ntpd daemon is not
running during a ballot.
During a ballot the only open ports on the servers are tcp 80/443 (and, only if
needed, icmp echo-request). The only possible way of login on the servers is at the
console.
The core of the implementation is given by PHP-5 scripts which can be down-
loaded under a GPLv2 license. The PHP scripts require the php-gpgme extension
to interact with gnupg. Some crucial routines have been written in C.
In the rest of this paper we will describe our example implementation of the pro-
tocol, even if the system can be installed on different OS and web-servers following
a similar procedure, or implemented in similar way.
4 Ballot setup and procedures
To implement the protocol, besides the voter, 5 human roles, ballot officials and
machine administrators, are needed:
1. the Authentication Managers (AuthMgr) must organize the ballot selecting
the eligible voters and providing them with the voting credentials; at the end
of the voting period they must check that only eligible voters have casted a
ballot
2. the Managers of the Authentication Web Server (AuthSysMgr) must setup and
run the Authentication Web Server and provide the AuthMgr with the list of
voters that have casted a ballot at the end of the voting period
3. the Managers of the Anonymizer System (AnonSysMgr) must guarantee that
all connections to the Vote Web Server do not leak information on the IP
address of the voter computer
4. the Vote Managers (VoteMgr) must count the votes at the end of the voting
period and announce the result of the ballot
5. the Managers of the Vote Web Server (VoteSysMgr) must setup and run the
Vote Web Server and provide, at the end of the voting period, the VoteMgr
with the encrypted votes that have been casted. In the configuration of the
Vote Web Server the VoteSysMgr must be careful that no information on the
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voter’s connection will be ever logged (this is an extra precaution since this
information should be removed by the client-proxy and the Anonymizer).
Each manager creates her own OpenPGP private/public key and gives to the
other managers the public key.
Every cryptographic operations must be done with reasonably secure algorithms,
so for example symmetric algorithms, like AES, should have at least 128-bit keys,
asymmetric algorithms, like RSA, at least 1024-bit keys and cryptographic digest
(or hashes) more than 130-bit hash, so at the moment of writing for example SHA1
can be used but not MD5.
The AuthMgr, optionally in collaboration with the AuthSysMgr, creates the
vote credentials for all voters:
• username + password and/or client digital certificate (these can be reused for
more ballots)
• a PseudoRandom (PR) string called VoteToken,1 unique for each voter and
each ballot and that can be used only once.
(As a technical detail, the username have been chosen in the charset [a-zA-Z0-
9 .@-] and the VoteToken in the charset [a-zA-Z0-9 .] .)
The AuthSysMgr and the VoteSysMgr create the digital certificates for their
https web servers and give the fingerprints of the certificate to the AuthMgr.
The AuthMgr distributes to all voters the ballot credentials and the fingerprints.
It is suggested that the username+password and VoteToken are distributed using
different communication channels.
The AuthSysMgr installs in the gnupg keyring of the AuthSrv her own private
and public OpenPGP key and the public keys of the AuthMgr and VoteSysMgr. The
VoteSysMgr does the same on her server with her own private and public OpenPGP
key and the public keys of the AuthMgr, AuthSysMgr and VoteMgr.
The AnonSysMgr must configure the Anonymizer so to redirect all packets to
the VoteSrv and not log any connection.
After the applications have been configured (see the next sections) the server will
be sealed by the AuthMgr and VoteMgr respectively and no login or modification of
the software can be done. All accesses or modification must be logged and reported
so that the respective manager can check the integrity of the machine during all the
period of the ballot. After the sealing of the servers, the systems start accepting
connections from the voters.
After a voter has successfully authenticated, the AuthSrv checks that the Vote-
Token has not been used already and generates a unique PR string called VoteAu-
thorization (the VoteAuthorization has been chosen in the charset [a-zA-Z0-9 .]).
The AuthSrv digitally signs and encrypts with the AuthMgr public key the used
VoteToken together with the username of the voter and the current timestamp, and
saves it on the disk in a file having as name the VoteToken to mark it as used. The
AuthSrv digitally signs and encrypts with the VoteSysMgr public key the VoteAu-
thorization (and the optional PIN, see [1]) and sends it to the voter (optionally with
1This is also called a Secret Token to stress the role of this credential.
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the PIN in clear). The AuthSrv also digitally signs and encrypts with the AuthMgr
public key the VoteAuthorization (but not the optional PIN) and saves it on the
disk in a file having as name the VoteAuthorization.
The voter then connects to the VoteSrv through the Anonymizer, receives the
web Form with the ballot, and sends to the server her ballot and the VoteAutho-
rization. The VoteSrv verifies that the VoteAuthorization decrypts correctly, has
the correct signature of the AuthSysMgr, and has not been used before. If there
is a PIN, it checks that the PIN submitted in the Form is the same as the one
included in the decrypted VoteAuthorization. The VoteSrv digitally signs and en-
crypts with the AuthMgr public key the VoteAuthorization and saves it on the disk
in a file having as name the VoteAuthorization to mark it as used. It then com-
putes a digest of the vote with the current timestamp and a random string and calls
it VerificationCode, digitally signs and encrypts with the VoteMgr public key the
vote together with the VerificationCode and saves it on the disk in a file having as
name the VerificationCode (the VerificationCode is a hexadecimal string). Finally
it computes the digital signature of the VerificationCode and sends to the voter the
VerificationCode, its digital signature, the timestamp and the random string.
The voter can recompute the VerificationCode using her vote, the timestamp
and the random string, and the VoteMgr can check that the VerificationCode is
authentic by verifying the digital signature of the VerificationCode done by the
VoteSrv.
At the end of the ballot period, the AuthMgr checks the AuthSrv and removes
the seal. Then the AuthSysMgr prepares one CD with the list of used VoteTokens
and created VoteAuthorizations and gives it to the AuthMgr. The VoteMgr checks
the VoteSrv and removes the seal. The VoteSysMgr prepares two CDs, one with
the used VoteAuthorizations and gives it to the AuthMgr, the other with the votes
and gives it to the VoteMgr.
The AuthMgr decrypts and checks the signatures of her two CDs. She verifies
that the information is consistent and that the number of votes is consistent with
the number of used VoteTokens and VoteAuthorizations. The AuthMgr publishes
the list of used VoteTokens with the associated username and timestamp and the
list of unused VoteTokens.
The VoteMgr does not decrypts the votes but publishes the list of Verification-
Codes (remember that each vote is in a file having as name the VerificationCode).
The voters have now time to check that the information published are correct:
if they have voted or not, the time of their authentication and the existence of
their VerificationCode. If there is a problem they must report it to the AuthMgr or
VoteMgr.
After this check is done, the VoteMgr decrypts the votes, checks the signatures
and count them. The VoteMgr then publishes the list of each vote with the associ-
ated VerificationCode and the final results of the ballot. Each voter can check that
her vote is correctly listed and that the final count is correct.
We now assume that the systems are setup correctly and that the procedures
are followed as described.
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5 Operating system setup and security
As already mentioned, the two servers must be configured so that they can be sealed
before the beginning of the ballot and the managers can check that no modification
to the software nor login to the system are done during the ballot itself. We will
describe below how we have chosen to seal the systems. For what concerns the
verification of the integrity two things must be done:
• verify that programs are not modified
• verify that logs are not tampered with.
For the integrity of the programs and of the log files various approaches can be
adopted. For example a forensic image of the disk can be made before the sealing
of the machine and a verification of the modifications after the end of the ballot. It
is simpler, but we believe still appropriate for our purposes, to use a program like
tripwire [11] or aide [12] to record the digest and properties of all files on the disk
and check that they have not been modified at the end of the ballot.
Besides the normal hardening of the operating system, we have included some
extra features which should increase notably the level of security of the systems.
As mentioned, for our implementation we have adopted the RSBAC patch to the
Linux kernel which introduces Mandatory Access Control features. The RSBAC-
patched Linux kernel, for our purposes, can be said to be in one of the following
three states:
rsbac softmode MAC rules are not enforced but violations are logged
rsbac enforcing MAC rules are enforced at the kernel level but the security officer
(uid=400) can modify the MAC rules (the root user, uid=0, cannot modify
the MAC rules, nor any other user)
rsbac frozen MAC rules are enforced at the kernel level and nobody can modify
any MAC rule: to switch to one of the previous states a reboot is needed with
a special kernel parameter (this is the default state).
The rsbac frozen mode corresponds to the sealed status of the servers.
The MAC rules adopted mark most of the disk as read-only and execute, mark
the log files as append-only, disable the loading of kernel modules after boot, disable
the mounting of partitions on directories etc. In particular, all executable and
configuration files both of the OS and of the eballot application (e.g. the PHP
scripts) are marked as read-only and executable so that they cannot be modified
while running in enforcing or frozen mode by any user or program.
But the specific purpose of RSBAC is to solve a particular problem of our imple-
mentation. As we have seen both the AuthSrv and the VoteSrv record information
in flat files:
• the AuthSrv writes on disk the used VoteTokens
• the AuthSrv writes on disk the created VoteAuthorizations
• the VoteSrv writes on disk the used VoteAuthorizations
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• the VoteSrv writes on disk the votes.
Each one of these is written to its own file with its own distinguished name. We
should guarantee that
• the file is written only if it does not exist
• the file cannot be modified or deleted after creation.
In practice we need write-once read-many files. The first possible solution to this
problem is to use special write-once read-many devices. Besides the cost of these
devices, there is a problem: the order of the files in the device is exactly the order in
which they are written, thus by matching this order is possible to match voter, e.g.
VoteToken, to VoteAuthorization to Vote (obviously if one has read access to all
devices). To prevent this, we need to add another requirement on the file creation:
• the order in the directory and timestamp of the files should not be meaningful.
A second solution is to adopt normal disks and to use RSBAC to mimic as much
as possible the behavior of a write-once read-many filesystem. What we can do is
to mark as append-only the directories and all included files where our files will
be written. Moreover the partitions where these files reside must be mounted with
hard-locking enabled. Thus when we write one of these files we open-append it
acquiring a hard lock only if the file does not exist, and before starting writing we
check that the file is empty. Doing in this way, the files can be always appended
later, so it is not a true write-once, but the initial contents of the files cannot be
modified. We then change the access time and modified time of all files in the
directory to a fixed timestamp, so that all files appear as having been created and
modified at the same time (this is again possible using the detailed permissions on
capabilities of RSBAC).
Still we haven’t completely solved the problem of the ordering of the files in the
directories since both the order of the filenames in the directory file and the inode
numbers leak information about the order of creation of the files. In our tests the
leaked information appears to be little and difficult to use so that at best we have
been able to reconstruct only a partial order of the files which has not allowed us
to precisely match files in different directories.
6 Application setup and security
The PHP applications require some configuration. The choices give different level
of security and different features. As always, more user-friendly features often cor-
respond to lower security levels.
To configure the AuthSrv we need to add the public and private OpenPGP
keys already described. The private key of the AuthSysMgr is encrypted with a
passphrase. The application allows either to write the passphrase to a file which
is read every time it is needed, or it is loaded by the system manager at boot by
hand in a opportunely configured gpg-agent. The second choice is in principle more
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secure, since the passphrase is not written in a file readable by the apache user, but
adds an extra failure point. Indeed if the gpg-agent crashes or stops working, the
full application cannot work either. The same considerations apply to the VoteSrv.
It is possible to choose if each username must correspond to a single VoteToken,
or if username and VoteToken are checked independently. In this second case more
voters can use the same username, but still each voter can use her own VoteToken
only once.
It is possible to choose the length of the random string generated by the appli-
cation giving the possibility to balance the trade-off between time to generate and
space to memorize, likelihood of collisions and so on.
Having two independent servers running, a possible problem arises if the second
server is unreachable, not working or if the voter wants to connect to it at a later
moment. Since the VoteToken can be used only once, how can the voter save her
VoteAuthorization for later use?
In the application there are two possibilities on top of the more secure but less
friendly of not allowing the voter to save her VoteAuthorization. (Actually the
VoteAuthorization is stored as a hidden field in the web Form sent to the voter’s
browser. By reading the source of the page the voter can save her VoteAuthorization.
Moreover notice that if a client proxy is used, this problem does not arise since the
client proxy can store securely the VoteAuthorization for the voter.)
The first solution is to offer the possibility to the voter to print (or save on disk)
her VoteAuthorization. Later on the voter can connect directly to the VoteSrv
(through the Anonymizer) and type/past in a web Form the VoteAuthorization.
The second possibility is to store the VoteAuthorization on the AuthSrv as a
file with a name containing the voter’s VoteToken. If the voter authenticates again
to the AuthSrv with her own already used VoteToken, no new VoteAuthorization
is created but the old VoteAuthorization is given to the voter. At the end of the
ballot period all stored temporary VoteAuthorizations are deleted since they could
leak some information between the voter (the VoteToken in the filename) and the
VoteAuthorization (even if these last are encrypted with the VoteSysMgr public
key).
In both cases, as an added security for the voter, a PIN can be generated and
added to the VoteAuthorization before encryption. This PIN is not stored anywhere
else and is only sent to the voter when the VoteAuthorization is first created. When
the voter later connects to the VoteSrv, she will be asked the PIN in the ballot web
Form. Thus even if someone intercepts or steals the stored VoteAuthorization and
tries to cast a ballot with it, without the PIN is useless.
The configuration of the VoteSrv is similar to the one of the AuthSrv.
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